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Article 8

Text or Consequences?
Jane S. Schacter†
I.

INTRODUCTION

The magnetic pull of taxonomy is a well-worn feature of
scholarship in the realm of statutory interpretation and
beyond. Casting competing theories in bold relief and in terms
of what separates them produces sharp and lively exchanges.
And so it has been with textualism in statutory interpretation.
The approach was once dubbed the “new textualism,”1 though
presumably the moniker of novelty can be dropped now that
twenty years have passed since textualism first appeared, close
on the heels of its avatar, Justice Antonin Scalia, taking his
seat on the Supreme Court. In those two decades, textualism
has been set against intentionalism, purposivism, dynamic
interpretation, pragmatism, and other worthy competitors in a
vigorous normative debate.2
As part of this contest over interpretive first principles,
Justices Scalia and Stephen Breyer have engaged one another
repeatedly, and they show no sign of fatigue as they continue a
long-running interpretive road show that has brought this
debate to various venues and to C-SPAN viewers.3 The lines of
†

William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Thanks
to Jessica Spradling for excellent research assistance and to the participants in the
Symposium for helpful comments and discussions.
1
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621,
623 (1990).
2
See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION 765-98 (4th ed. 2007).
3
Justice Scalia’s core ideas are concisely laid out in ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997). Justice Breyer’s competing views on legislative
history are laid out in Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992), and his broader views on the centrality of
statutory purpose are laid out in STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 88105 (2010). The two have debated each other numerous times. See, e.g., Brooke Bellomy,
Justices Scalia, Breyer Speak at Lecture Series, DAILY TOREADOR (Nov. 14, 2010),
http://www.dailytoreador.com/news/article_7bf7c942-f04a-11df-b524-0017a4a78c22.html;
Constitutional Conversation (C-SPAN television broadcast Apr. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/Conversation; Constitutional Issues (C-SPAN
television broadcast Dec. 5, 2006), available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/
ConstitutionalIss; Original Intent and a Living Constitution (C-SPAN television
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the overall debate are, by now, familiar.4 Scalia stresses the
singular legitimacy and crisp constitutional pedigree of
statutory text, and the imperative of suppressing judicial
policymaking.5 Breyer trumpets the greater commitment of his
approach to values like meaningful legislative supremacy, the
functional value of consulting legislative history, and the
pragmatic virtues of a nondogmatic approach that is open to an
eclectic range of interpretive resources.6
It has become somewhat common for observers of this
debate to proclaim that “we are all textualists now.”7 Indeed,
some commentators have flatly declared the triumph of
textualism, though it is uncertain just what that means in light
of the distinctions drawn by some of the same observers
between “moderate” and “aggressive” textualism, and
associated arguments about the convergence of text- and
intent-based theories.8 The convergence hypothesis has been
resisted in some quarters based on the belief that textualism is
implacably “radical” at its conceptual core.9 This radicalism,
however, has been ascribed more to scholarly proponents of
textualism than to those who practice it as judges.
It is the gap between theory and practice that I would
like to reflect on in this short essay. To borrow from the law
and society framework and adapt the idea for our purposes, let
us call it the gap between textualism on the books (its formal
theory) and textualism in action (how it is actually applied in
broadcast Mar. 23, 2010), available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/Intenta;
Principles of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (C-SPAN television broadcast
Oct. 26, 2009), available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/Statuto.
4
For a concise overview, see Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of
Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism,
119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1761-68 (2010).
5
See generally SCALIA, supra note 3.
6
See generally BREYER, supra note 3; Breyer, supra note 3.
7
See Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative
Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1057 (1998) (“In a significant sense, we are all textualists
now.”); see also, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings
of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990,
1090 (2001) (“[T]he proposition that statutory text . . . ought to be the primary source of
statutory meaning . . . needs little defense today. We are all textualists.”); Jonathan T.
Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 43 (2006) (“[W]e are all
textualists in an important sense.”); Marjorie O. Rendell, 2003—A Year of Discovery:
Cybergenics and Plain Meaning in Bankruptcy Cases, 49 VILL. L. REV. 887, 887 (2004)
(“We are all textualists now.”).
8
See, e.g., Molot, supra note 7, at 43; Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91
VA. L. REV. 347, 348-49 (2005).
9
See generally Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of
Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117 (2009).
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cases). I have no quarrel with the idea that textualism on the
books can be quite radical. I would like to suggest, though, that
textualism in action can be, and often is, deployed in a far more
pragmatic way, and that highlighting that point can suggest
some new normative inquiries. To develop this point, I will use
as my frame of reference the interpretation of federal statutory
law,10 and focus on textualism’s most famous adherent. That
seems only appropriate as this symposium coincides with
Justice Scalia’s twenty-fifth anniversary on the Supreme
Court. The particular point I would like to press is this: while
textualism on the books conspicuously eschews the legitimacy
of consequentialism in statutory interpretation, textualism in
action often uses strikingly consequentialist methods. In other
words, it can and does argue for and against particular
interpretations of statutory language based explicitly on the
policy consequences that would follow—consequences that are
not imputed to Congress as part of the legislative purpose.
I mean something less global and more refined than a
general claim that “textualism is as activist as anything else.” In
particular, I mean the specific idea that judicially determined
policy consequences can, and often do, figure quite prominently
in textualist reasoning and method. This idea is, of course,
anathema to the intellectual claims and premises of textualist
theory. Indeed, on occasion, Justice Scalia has gone out of his
way to dissociate himself explicitly from this style of argument,
saying, for example, “I do not think . . . that the avoidance of
unhappy consequences is adequate basis for interpreting a
text.”11 Revealing and probing this aspect of textualism in
practice can give us a fuller and more accurate picture of the
method, and open up an important set of prescriptive questions
that are missed when we take textualism at face value and
debate its wisdom only as an abstraction.
II.

DISCUSSION

Textualism’s consequentialist tendencies are apparent
at three levels of analysis: general claims of substantive goods
it supposedly produces; the textual canons it accommodates
10

The idea of looking at textualism in action ought to extend to state courts
as well, though that question is beyond my scope here. See generally Gluck, supra note
4 (gathering empirical evidence suggesting “modified textualism” is alive and well in
the state courts).
11
Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 141 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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and employs; and particular statutory readings related to
policy consequences.
First, at the most general level, textualism is itself
conceived and justified in strikingly consequentialist terms.
Consider the many salutary results claimed by its proponents.
Among other things, textualism is said to encourage judicial
restraint;12 promote democratic values;13 avoid the particular
“harm” that results from permitting courts to “psychoanalyze[]
Congress rather than read[] its laws”;14 curb the undue
influence of lobbyists, interest groups, and unelected staffers;15
and further the rule of law by making the meaning of statutory
law more accessible to citizens.16 And the list might go on.17
To be fair, the justification for textualism might be
restated as more intrinsic than instrumental by focusing on the
familiar claim that the Constitution demands textualist
methodology.18 But that claim depends on a contestable view of
the Constitution—and one that is itself bound up with, and
inspired by, the institutional consequences it is said to produce.
Moreover, the other, and more obviously consequentialist,
claims for textualism enumerated above persist. Rather than
have a somewhat metaphysical debate about the difference
between a consequence and a claim of inherent worth, then, let
us simply stipulate that proponents of textualism commonly
tout several desirable consequences that they claim their
approach will produce.
Second, Justice Scalia’s textualism accepts and
accommodates a number of canons that can be, and have been,

12

SCALIA, supra note 3, at 17-18 (arguing that intentionalism allows judges
to “pursue their own objectives and desires” and should thus be replaced by textualism,
which will confine them to “what the legislature said,” not “what it meant”).
13
See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 417 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that textualism will give Congress “a sure means by which it may work the
people’s will”).
14
Id.
15
See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring);
SCALIA, supra note 3, at 32-37.
16
See SCALIA, supra note 3, at 17 (comparing intentionalism to Nero’s
“posting edicts high up on the pillars, so that they could not easily be read”).
17
See generally John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2387, 2476 & n.319 (2003) (citing portions of Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean
Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616, 636 (1949), as a defense of formalism of the textualist
sort in terms of its costs and consequences).
18
SCALIA, supra note 3, at 34-35.
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deployed in consequentialist fashion.19 As a general matter,
Scalia has criticized substantive canons as questionable “diceloading rules.”20 But he has approved the use of what he calls
“established canons of construction,” which he suggests can be
properly employed to show that “some permissible meaning
other than the ordinary one applies.”21 The mother of all
consequentialist canons is undoubtedly the rule that statutes
should not be construed to produce absurd results. By definition,
the absurdity doctrine is oriented precisely to avoiding bad
policy consequences. In a textualist critique of this canon, John
Manning collected a number of opinions in which Scalia (as well
as textualist Judge Frank Easterbrook) employed it or approved
of its use.22 Manning argues that textualism ought to banish the
absurdity canon—or, on my reading of his argument, drive the
canon underground by reframing it in terms of background
conventions.23 His own critique notwithstanding, however,
Manning freely acknowledges that neither Justice Scalia—nor
for that matter Judge Easterbrook—have jettisoned absurdity in
the name of textualism.24 Interestingly, Scalia has not only
applied the absurdity canon on its own, but has, on occasion,
linked it with more semantically oriented canons, such as
expressio unius,25 thus giving those kinds of canons their own
consequentialist twist.
The consequentialist use of canons as part of textualism
is not limited to absurdity. Other canons deemed “established”
19

On the general ways in which canons are associated with the justices’
ideologies, see James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the
Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2005).
20
SCALIA, supra note 3, at 28-29.
21
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22
See Manning, supra note 17, at 2419 nn.122-23 (citing Burns v. United
States, 501 U.S. 129, 135 (1991) (Scalia, J., joining majority opinion); Green v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-28 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); City of
Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 449 n.4 (2002) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); United States v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 236 F.3d 883, 885 (7th Cir. 2001)
(Easterbrook, J.); Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1998) (Easterbrook, J.)).
23
Manning, supra note 17, at 2419-31; see also John C. Nagle, Textualism’s
Exceptions, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Nov. 2002, http://www.bepress.com/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=ils.
24
Manning, supra note 17, at 2419-20, 2471.
25
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius reflects the idea that including
particular things in a statute implies the exclusion of others. See BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004). Justice Scalia has indicated support for the idea that
the absurdity principle imposes a limitation on expressio unius. See Pauley v.
Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 719-20 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Burns v.
United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136-38 (1991) (Scalia, J., joining majority opinion).
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by Scalia have also been used in this way.26 For example, Scalia
has invoked clear statement rules in ways explicitly calibrated
to preventing policy consequences deemed inconsistent with
the normative tenets underlying such rules. In the realm of
federalism, for example, he argued in Rapanos v. United States
against an interpretation of the Clean Water Act that would
“authorize an unprecedented intrusion into traditional state
authority.”27 There are substantial questions about whether the
clear statement rule employed in Rapanos can credibly be
considered well established given its recent vintage, but the
pertinent point for our purposes is the manner in which it was
used, not the fact of use itself.
In the realm of disability law, Justice Scalia has used a
clear statement rule to argue against the application of Title III
of the Americans with Disabilities Act to foreign-flag ships. In
this context, he appealed to, among other things, the risk of
subjecting ships to inconsistent international regulatory
requirements.28 These arguments can be reframed as matters of
reasonable meaning (as in, “what sensible Congress would
trample state prerogatives or create the risk of international
commercial chaos in this fashion?”), but that strikes me as a
thin defense against the claim of canonical consequentialism.
We can go through a similar exercise with respect to other
canons as well.29
Third, and perhaps most significant for my analysis,
textualism can be deployed in a consequentialist fashion when,
without regard to canons, particular readings of a statutory
term are preferred or disfavored based on the policy
consequences that such readings are thought likely to produce.
I am thinking here of instances in which the relevant policy
consequences are not attributable in a specific way to
congressional choice. Take, for example, Justice Scalia’s
26

For a discussion of canons deemed “established” by Scalia, and a critique of
the category itself, see Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1971, 1987-92 (2005).
27
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006).
28
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 149 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
29
See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 19, at 13 nn.48-51 (listing examples of
opinions that utilize canons, several of which are authored or joined by Justice Scalia,
including: Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452-53 (2002) (expressio unius);
Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-15 (2001) (esjudem generis); Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S 471, 482, 487 (1999) (Whole Act Rule); and Ford Motor
Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 225-26, 226 n.8, 233 n.19 (1982) (in pari materia)); see also
supra text accompanying note 22.
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Rapanos opinion interpreting the Clean Water Act. He not only
invoked the clear statement rule alluded to above, but also
launched a screed against the excesses of federal regulation,
citing $1.7 billion in annual costs incurred by those seeking
wetlands permits and helping to make a consequentialist case
for his reading of the statutory terms.30
Consider, as well, Scalia’s dissent in Babbitt v. Sweet
Home.31 In vigorously disputing the majority’s construction of the
term “take” in the Endangered Species Act to include habitat
modification, Scalia made many arguments, including that
it produces a result that no legislature could reasonably be thought
to have intended: A large number of routine private activities—for
example, farming, ranching, roadbuilding, construction and
logging—are subjected to strict-liability penalties when they
fortuitously injure protected wildlife, no matter how remote the
chain of causation and no matter how difficult to foresee (or to
disprove) the “injury” may be (e.g., an “impairment” of breeding).32

Note that this argument collects and emphasizes a set of
consequences thought to be beyond the pale, but does not
attempt to impute this concern to the enacting Congress in any
specific or factual sense. It loosely invokes a hypothetical
Congress, but employs a rhetorical device that, in previous
work, I have argued is akin to “the Court more or less play[ing]
ventriloquist to a hypothetical congressional dummy” because
“[t]he important move here is the one made by the Court, not
Congress: the identification of the policy baseline against which
the range of plausible legislative meanings is gauged.”33
In an article about the 1998 Supreme Court term, I
called this category of interpretive resources “judiciallyselected policy norms.”34 When Justice Scalia argued in various
cases during that term, for example, that a proffered reading of
a statute should be rejected because it would undermine
settlement incentives, lead to expensive factual inquiries,
generate boondoggles, create a zany system, or produce
perverse policy results of various stripes,35 he chose the critical
30

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721.
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,
714 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
32
Id. at 721-22.
33
Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate
and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 25 (1998).
34
Id.
35
See id. at 63-71 app. B.
31
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policy norm, used it to guide interpretation, and did so in a
straightforwardly consequentialist way.
Nor was he alone in using this mode of analysis. To the
contrary, I found that mode to be utterly routine—it appeared in
73% of that term’s statutory interpretation opinions—and to
cross conventional interpretive divides.36 The regular use of these
consequentialist arguments, along with an eclectic array of other
resources, prompted me to suggest that the idea of “common law
originalism” described the Supreme Court’s interpretive
practices better than any of the conventional “isms” could.
My own analysis looked only at a single Supreme Court
term, but the evidence suggests it was no outlier. Nick Zeppos’s
analysis of a random sample of Supreme Court cases decided
between 1890 and 1990 reflected an eclectic range of resources,
as well as significant use of what he called “[c]onsequentialist
or practical considerations.”37 He found these considerations to
be used in nearly one-third of the cases. That is less frequent
usage than I found, though still substantial.38
More relevant for our purposes, perhaps, is that
subsequent scholarly analyses of the Supreme Court’s practices
in statutory cases have also found frequent use of judicial
policy norms.39 Indeed, it has persisted in a variety of
substantive contexts.40 And recent work sheds some new light
on the use of these judicial norms. Anita Krishnakumar has
disaggregated the category by distinguishing between norms
36

Id. at 18 tbl.1.
Nicholas Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An
Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1097 (1992).
38
I suspect the difference is attributable to our having defined the category
differently. The operative categories here can be somewhat slippery because, as I
suggested above, the rhetoric can be deployed to impute the consciousness of
consequences to Congress, not the interpreter. An argument that simply invokes x
consequence to defeat an interpretation might be counted differently than one that
says, “It simply could not have been Congress’s intent to produce x.” In substance,
however, they are often the same, and I would treat them as such, unless the opinion
cites some specific evidence of congressional concern with the relevant consequence.
39
See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s
First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 224-25, 228-29,
235-38 (2010); Miranda McGowan, Do as I Do, Not as I Say: An Empirical Investigation
of Justice Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78 MISS. L.J.
129, 173 (2008); Alan Schwartz, The New Textualism and the Rule of Law Subtext in
the Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 149, 150-55,
192-97 apps. A-B (2000); Nancy Staudt et al., Judging Statutes: Interpretive Regimes,
38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1909, 1911, 1960 (2005). Frank Cross found less frequent usage of
practical considerations, but also appears to have used a more restrictive
understanding of the term. See FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 134-43, 147-48 (2009).
40
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 39 (bankruptcy); Staudt, supra note 39 (tax).
37
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oriented toward “legal landscape coherence” and those oriented
toward “statute-specific coherence,” and has noted that Justice
Scalia favors the former category.41 Her analysis of the early
Roberts Court supplies many examples of these kinds of
consequentialist arguments, including arguments by Scalia, for
whom she found “[p]ractical [c]onsequences” to be the thirdmost used interpretive tool, following only “[t]ext/[p]lain
[m]eaning” and “Supreme Court [p]recedent.”42
Similarly, in an extended analysis of Scalia’s dissents,
Miranda McGowan documented that he regularly employed a
consequentialist style of argument.43 In her data, this style of
argument appeared in some 70% of the dissenting opinions.44
She also somewhat disaggregated the category. Canvassing the
various dissents, she separated out, for example, what she
called “absurdity-lite” arguments that stressed the policy
anomalies that would result from a given interpretation; the
approach of “[p]utting [p]urposes in Congress’s [m]outh”; the
appeal to what Justice Scalia often calls “common sense”; and
the frequent concern with the “[w]orkability” of different
interpretations of the statute.45 These are recurring interpretive
themes, each one in some way focusing on the results thought
to flow from a particular reading of statutory language.
III.

CONCLUSION

Given that I am not, myself, a textualist, this might be
the point in the paper where you expect me to say “gotcha.” And
while that is always an attractive possibility, I confess, I think
the better response might be something more like “phew.”
Textualism’s ability to be deployed in a consequentialist way is a
virtue, not a vice. This hardly cures all of textualism’s ills, but
the fact that the approach can be, and sometimes is, used with a
pragmatic sensitivity to policy consequences is a source of some
reassurance against the fears of textualist mindlessness.46 But
41

See Krishnakumar, supra note 39, at 225-27.
See id. at 250-51 tbl.2.
43
McGowan, supra note 39, at 175.
44
Id. at 173.
45
Id. at 176, 183-88.
46
See W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 113 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing textualism for interpreting laws through “thick grammarian’s
spectacles”); BREYER, supra note 3, at 91 (textualism is missing necessary context for
language); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241,
250, 258 (1992) (textualism as literalism).
42
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its concern with consequences should be acknowledged more
forthrightly so that it can be analyzed more systematically.
When textualism’s defenders—including Justice Scalia—deny
this trait and seek shelter in formalist justification alone,
productive normative analysis of this sort is more easily avoided.
The basic question to be addressed, I suggest, is not whether an
interpretive approach is consequentialist, but how it is. We
ought, then, to move from the mode of revelation to one of
evaluation—that is, to a mode in which the particular ways that
different interpretive methodologies that encourage interpreters
to weigh policy consequences can be compared, contrasted, and
assessed in careful relation to one another. That is an important
set of comparative questions to which scholars might
productively turn.
Textualism, intentionalism, purposivism, and virtually
any credible approach to statutory interpretation will begin
with the language, but the approach will be crucially shaped by
how it selects from among the plausible interpretations. That is
where, we have seen, the consideration of consequences enters
the analysis. Plainly, textualism does not consider
consequences in the same way that intentionalism or
purposivism does, for it does so by using text and canons as the
launching pad for this analysis. Is that the best way to consider
consequences? Setting aside questions of candor, it is quite
threadbare. It gives the interpreter little with which to work to
identify and assess the policy consequences likely to flow from
different understandings of the contested statutory langauge.
Given the ubiquity of some form of consequentialist
concern across interpretive methods, then, judges, scholars,
and lawyers might begin to think more systematically about
the appropriate source of the norms that will guide interpreters
as they sort through arguments about consequences. One
obvious source of norms is Congress itself. On this point, the
ability of intent- or purpose-based approaches to assimilate
information about the policy consequences that Congress
sought or feared gives those approaches a functional advantage
over textualism. And it suggests the particular utility of
legislative history. Moreover, legislative history has a role to
play in assessing policy consequences even without fully
embracing intentionalist or purposivist methods. Putting aside
the question of what members of Congress may have wanted,
congressional reports and debates reflect a sustained analysis
of the relevant policy area. Irrespective of which interpretive
theory is chosen, in other words, these reports and debates are
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likely to be a relatively rich source of information about the
policy area, and therefore about the possible consequences
associated with different interpretations of the statute.
Legislative history is not, however, the only plausible
source of information about the relevant policy consequences.
Briefing by lawyers, including Brandeis briefs, might
productively address that issue. Similarly, the view of relevant
administrative agencies about likely consequences might be
sought out and considered by judges, even in cases in which the
agency’s own interpretation of the statute is not at issue. In
this way, interpretive litigation might function in appropriate
cases as a forum for developing evidence, in a focused way,
about the results likely to flow from different interpretations.
Questions of fact will not and should not replace questions of
law, but they might usefully inform them. Treating the policy
consequences of different interpretations as a factual matter
bearing on interpretation would likely have some procedural
implications. For example, encouraging policy analysis of this
sort might entail loosening the grip of the traditional
distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts in
appropriate cases.47 And this idea might affect how and when
summary judgment motions are used in statutory
interpretation cases. These implications—and others—ought to
be identified and examined in a thoughtful way.
To have any shot at improving matters, all of these
possibilities would require some willingness on the part of
judicial interpreters to be forthright about the role of
consequentialist analysis, among other interpretive tools.
Formidable institutional and cultural forces work against
openly embracing the idea that judges ought to function as,
essentially, problem solvers with some necessary policy
latitude to work through the implications of plausible
interpretations of a statute. Scholars might play a useful role
in encouraging that shift by probing less the theory, and more
the practice, of interpretive methodology.

47

On the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts, see 2
KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 10.5
(3d ed. 1994).

